The Liar – Perhaps False

Authors

  • Andrej Ule Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Keywords:

truth, the Liar, paradox, object language, meta-language, self-reference, saying

Abstract

I present some main variants of the Liar paradox, the Quine’s and Smullyan’s purified version of the paradox, and some possible reason for it (e. i. selfreference, overlooking of mention/use difference, mixture of object language and metalanguage, etc.). I am relying then on a less known Wittgenstein’s remark regarding truth of sentence (NB, January 11, 1914) from that it follows: “p” is true = p and (“p” says p). It turns out that the Layer in the usual and in the purified formulations given by Quine and Smullyan does not satisfy this condition, that is, it cannot say what it “means” to say. Thus it is false. However, it does not follow that the Layer (for example “This sentence is false”) then is true (but it says so of itself). That sentence does not speak so because his saying is vacuous.

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Published

31.05.2002

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Ule, A. (2002). The Liar – Perhaps False. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 5(4), 3–23. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6737