The Liar – Perhaps False
Keywords:
truth, the Liar, paradox, object language, meta-language, self-reference, sayingAbstract
I present some main variants of the Liar paradox, the Quine’s and Smullyan’s purified version of the paradox, and some possible reason for it (e. i. selfreference, overlooking of mention/use difference, mixture of object language and metalanguage, etc.). I am relying then on a less known Wittgenstein’s remark regarding truth of sentence (NB, January 11, 1914) from that it follows: “p” is true = p and (“p” says p). It turns out that the Layer in the usual and in the purified formulations given by Quine and Smullyan does not satisfy this condition, that is, it cannot say what it “means” to say. Thus it is false. However, it does not follow that the Layer (for example “This sentence is false”) then is true (but it says so of itself). That sentence does not speak so because his saying is vacuous.
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Copyright (c) 2001 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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