Why We Are Not Free (Morally Responsible) and What (Does Not) Follow(s) from This
Keywords:
freedom, moral responsibility, (in)determinism, (in)compatibilism, PereboomAbstract
This article presents and critically evaluates Pereboom's article “Determinism al Dente” in which he mainly argues two things: firstly, hard incompatibilism is – because of “4-case argument” – the most convincing theoretical stance on freedom, determinism and their compatibilism; and secondly, objections against hard incompatibilism, namely that it prevents us from achieving important things in life, promotes immorality and impersonal relationships, and/or is practically impossible, are not convincing.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2016 Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.