The Criterion of Truth and Ancient Skepticism
Keywords:
truth, criterion of truth, Sextus Empiricus, knowledge, belief, justification, ataraxiaAbstract
What Andrej Ule calls the attainability of truth in his recent book is in fact easily found as the explicit topic of philosophical exploration in hellenistic philosophers, notably the Stoics and the Skeptics. Hellenistic philosophy deals with the question of its attainability basically through posing the question on the criterion of truth (kriterion tes aletheias). If we want to claim that p is true, we need some criterion by which we can judge its truth. Some rule or measure is acquired in order to determine whether our belief B about p is justified. The Stoics believed that p is true only if it is directly perceived by our senses in “clear” circumstances. The criterion is therefore exactly the justification of our belief: the criterion Cjustifies our belief B about p. Sextus Empiricus formed several ways of rejecting the criteria as such in his criticism of dogmatics. Three of them became famous under description “Agripa’s trilemma”. The article tries to demonstrate that even if the pyrrhonian skeptic refuses the valid criterion of knowledge, he is not giving up the possibility of attaining truth somehow and therefore his search continues.
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