Frege’s Conception of Existence

Authors

  • Matija Arko Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

existence, first order predicate, second order predicate, Gottlob Frege

Abstract

Frege has developed semantics, which allows the use of sentences, which contain empty names. Such sentences are neither true nor false. Frege is of the opinion that affirmation of existence is just a special case of affirmation of number. Saying that something exist is tantamount to saying that something is not zero. Existence is in the same way as number the property of concepts. Ascribing existence to the individuals is senseless and violates the rules of logical syntax. Frege supports in his early work “Dialog mit Pünjerjem über Existenz” the view that existence as the first order property is self-evident and cannot be denied. Existence is a property of everything. Therefore is a self-evident property and concept without content and unlimited extension. The claim that existence as predicate of first order is self-evident and therefore a concept without content and unlimited extension, must be understood as a hypothetical reasoning, what would happen if existence was a first order concept. Because existence has no content and cannot be denied, Frege does not accept it as a first order concept.

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Published

30.06.2002

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Arko, M. (2002). Frege’s Conception of Existence. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 6(1-2), 143–152. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6761