Foundationalism

Abstract

Foundationalism seeks to ground our knowledge in the beliefs about our sensory states, sense data and the ways one is appeared to. The basic foundationalist motivation is finding out some kind of would-be incorrigible beliefs which are self-justified and grounded. Self-justified beliefs are then necessary for avoiding epistemic regress in justification process. Beliefs about the ways one is appeared to – however incorrigible they seem to be – nevertheless remain only beliefs about subject’s states. Their incorrigibility is aquired at a heavy price – we must drop out every sign of their contents. It is not intelligible how such a kind of beliefs can form the base of our knowledge. Our beliefs about the ways one is appeared to are really incorrigible but from this fact it does not follow in no way that we are in possession of incorrigible knowledge about how things really are. I am also convinced that they are right those critics of foundationalism who claim that such a basic beliefs as are conceived in foundationalist theories do not exist at all. In normal living and epistemic conditions we do not have any beliefs about the ways one is appeared to. We have consciousness or experience about the ways one is appeared to but we do not have a cognitive state of belief.