Popper’s Falsificationism: A Critical Review

Abstract

It seems that the pole position in the pursuit of knowledge in the modern world belongs to science. Modern science is considered to be reliable and credible while its foundations are rarely doubted (other than in the philosophy of science). One line of philosophical argumentation for certainty of scientific practice is provided by Popper’s theory of falsification, which became one of the most prominent normative theories in the philosophy of science in the twentieth century. After a brief overview of the basic postulates of falsificationism, I present some of its shortcomings that were already expressed by Popper’s contemporaries. I aim to examine the reliability of falsification-based scientific practice, and review the adequacy of Popper’s criterion of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Findings of such an examination question the theory of falsification and open the path for further considerations on modern science, alternative methods of acquiring knowledge, and the attainability of truth altogether.