Asimetrija informacij v pogodbenem pravu

  • Jaka Cepec University of Ljubljana, School of Economics and Business
Keywords: contract law, information, asymmetric information, contracting, economic analysis of law

Abstract

Asymmetry of information in contract law. In his paper author discusses the issue of asymmetric information in contract law, using historical, comparative and economic analysis. He starts with the general economical theory of contracts and represents the asymmetric of information as the most common market failure. Further, he analyses the effects of asymmetric information in contracting and suggests a disclosure rule as a general solution for the problem. His final finding is that the general rule must be supplemented with an exception in the case of productive deliberately acquired information.

Povzetek. Avtor v prispevku s pomočjo ekonomske analize razpravlja o problemu asimetrije informacij v pogodbenem pravu. Uvodoma obravnava temelje ekonomske teorije pogodb ter predstavi teorijo sklepanja pogodb na popolnem in nepopolnem trgu. Pri tem ugotavlja, da je asimetrija informacij kot napaka trga eden izmed najpogostejših zapletov pri sklepanju pogodb. Posledice asimetrije so prepogosto oziroma preredko sklepanje pogodb, trg limon in napake volje, zato mora na trg informacij poseči pravo s s svojimi instituti. Avtor kot temeljno pravilo obravnava dolžnost razkritja informacij, ki ga dopolni z izjemo v primerih načrtno pridobljenih in produktivnih informacij.

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Author Biography

Jaka Cepec, University of Ljubljana, School of Economics and Business

Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: jaka.cepec@ef.uni-lj.si.

Published
2009-02-20
How to Cite
Cepec J. (2009). Asimetrija informacij v pogodbenem pravu. LeXonomica, 1(1), 59-74. https://doi.org/10.18690/lexonomica.1.1.59-74.2009
Section
Articles