Zakaj potrebujemo insolvenčno pravo?
Perspektiva ekonomske analize prava
Abstract
Zakaj potrebujemo insolvenčno pravo? perspektiva ekonomske analize prava
Avtor v prispevku predstavlja temelje ekonomske analize insolvenčnega prava, pri čemer pozornost namenja predvsem vzrokom za ekonomsko upravičenost obstoja insolvenčnega prava kot posebnega postopka za reševanje insolventnosti dolžnika ter cilje, ki jim naj z vidika ekonomske analize prava sledi insolvenčno pravo. Insolvenčno pravo potrebujemo zaradi minimiziranja izgub ob nastanku insolventnosti, saj je učinkovito rešitev mogoče najti samo s pravno regulacijo, ker pogodbeni dogovor med deležniki zaradi problema skupnega delovanja ni mogoč. Pravna regulacija postopkov zaradi insolventnosti mora predvidljivo in pregledno razporediti tveganja med deležniki insolvenčnega postopka, in sicer tako, da sledi kriteriju ex ante in ex post učinkovitosti, s čimer povečuje družbeno blaginjo.
Why Do We Need Insolvency Law? – Law and Economics Perspective
The paper presents the basic element of law and economics of insolvency law. It addresses the basic economic reasoning for the existence of insolvency law as a special procedure for solving the issues of an insolvent debtor and the objectives that the insolvency law should pursue. Insolvency law is needed to minimize losses upon the occurrence of insolvency, since contractual agreements between stakeholders, because of the collective action problem, are unlikely. Legal regulation of insolvency proceedings should provide a predictable and transparent procedure that allocates risks among the stakeholders based on the criteria of ex ante and ex post efficiency, thereby increasing social welfare.
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References
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