Povprečni izogibni stroški kot izhodišče za analizo roparskih cen v konkurenčnem pravu EU

Martina Repas

Martina Repas Associate professor, Faculty of Law, University of Maribor

Keywords: predatory pricing, average avoidable costs, average total costs, average variable costs, long-run average incremental costs, Areeda-Turner test, abuse of dominant position

Abstract

Average Avoidable Costs as the Starting- point of the Predatory Pricing Analysis in EU Competition Law. Article deals with predatory pricing as a price strategy, under which an undertaking charges extremely low prices (bellow costs) with the intent to exclude competitors from the market. Therefore, predatory pricing can lead to abuse of dominant position which is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU. Authoress analyses different views on the subject matter, reasonableness of such pricing strategy and EU case law. She also analyses the regulation of predatory pricing in the Commission's Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertaking, which sets the average avoidable costs and long-run incremental costs as the starting-point of the illegal predatory pricing. She also points to the differences between USA and EU regulation. The analysis of predatory pricing in the EU reveals deviation from the regulation and practice recognised in the USA, especially considering that under EU regulation the requirement of recoupment of losses is not a condition of finding the abuse of dominant position.

Povprečni izogibni stroški kot izhodišče za analizo roparskih cen v konkurenčnem pravu EU. Prispevek obravnava roparske (predatorske) cene kot cenovno strategijo, pri kateri podjetje oblikuje izjemno nizke cene (pod stroški) s ciljem izključitve konkurentov s trga, ki predstavlja eno izmed oblik zlorabe prevladujočega položaja po členu 102 PDEU. Avtorica analizira različne poglede na to tematiko, smiselnost oblikovanja tovrstnih cen in sodno prakso v EU. Prav tako analizira njeno ureditev v Navodilih Komisije glede prednostnih nalog izvrševanja Komisije pri uporabi člena 82 Pogodbe ES za izključevalna ravnanja, s katerimi prevladujoča podjetja zlorabljajo svoj položaj, ki je za izhodišče ugotovitve obstoja nezakonitih roparskih cen postavilo povprečne izogibne stroške in dolgoročne povprečne mejne stroške. Avtorica opozori tudi na razlike med ureditvijo v ZDA in EU. Analiza tovrstnih ravnanj v EU namreč kaže na odmik od ureditve oz. prakse v ZDA, med drugim zato, ker kot predpostavko za obstoj roparskih cen in s tem za zlorabo prevladujočega položaja ne zahteva tudi možnosti pokritja izgube, ki jo je podjetje imelo z oblikovanjem roparskih cen, v prihodnosti.

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Author Biography

Martina Repas, Associate professor, Faculty of Law, University of Maribor

Dr. Maribor, Slovenia. E-mail: martina.repas@uni-mb.si.

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