Vloga in usoda klavzule "vzemi ali plačaj" v konkurenčnem pravu
Abstract
Take-or-pay clause in competition law. Authors deal with take-or-pay clause and its compatibility with EU competition law rules. Take-or-pay clauses are fairly common in long-term of take and supply agreements in the gas sector. This clause is per se not problematic as far as competition law is concerned, but it can pose special competition problem, i.e. foreclosure effect in combination with other clauses in the agreement, such as resale restrictions, territorial restraints, reduction clause etc. It is also especially often a part of long-term exclusive contract that can also pose foreclosure problem. The analysis of its compatibility with competition law depends on agreements in which it is included or on a combination with other clauses and market conditions.
Povzetek. Avtorja se v prispevku ukvarjata z vprašanjem dopustnosti klavzule "vzemi ali plačaj" v konkurenčnem pravu, ki se v praksi pogosto pojavlja pri sklepanju vertikalnih sporazumov o dobavi zemeljskega plina. Glede na prakso nacionalnih konkurenčnih organov ta klavzula sama po sebi ni sporna, lahko pa ustvarja posebni konkurenčni problem, tj. omejevanja dostopa do trga, v povezavi z drugimi klavzulami, kot so npr. prepoved nadaljnje prodaje, teritorialne omejitve, omejitve glede rabe predmeta pogodbe, redukcijske klavzule ipd. Posebej pogosto pa se ta klavzula pojavlja v dolgoročnih pogodbah o dobavi zemeljskega plina, ki imajo lahko tudi naravno izključnih pogodb, kar je lahko prav tako problematično. Konkurenčnopravna presoja in usoda klavzule "vzemi ali plačaj" je tako odvisna od tega, v kakšnem sporazumu oz. v kombinaciji s kakšnimi klavzulami se pojavlja, prav tako pa tudi od razmer na trgu oz. pogojev konkurence na trgu.
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