Law and economics approaches to corporate governance
Abstract
This paper provides a critical assessment of existing theoretical approaches to corporate governance within law and economics. Conventional economic approaches to law, new institutionalism and behavioural science, as well as the transplant literature, are discussed and their limits indicated. We suggest that by incorporating novel concepts, such as receptiveness, familiarity, adaptation, and internal process of development, the evolutionary dynamics of law and economics signifies a tendency towards corporate governance analysis that involgves the study of institutional change and deals with questions that cannot be easily quantified. Such perspective invites a further look into the nature and evolution of legal norms and opens a way for a review of corporate governance arrangements from the perspective of unconventional socio-legal theories.
Pravni in ekonomski vidiki upravljanja družb. Prispevek kritično ovrednoti obstoječe teoretične pristope ekonomske analize prava na področju upravljanja družb, s poudarkom na klasični ekonomski analizi prava, teoriji t. i. novega institucionalizma in literaturi s področja transplantacije pravnih norm ter z namenom opredeliti in nakazati njihove meje. Moderni pristopi, ki so v analizo pravnih pravil vpeljali nekatere nove koncepte, kot so dovzetnost, prilagodljivost in notranji proces razvoja, nakazujejo trend v smeri obravnavanja področja upravljanja družb s pomočjo elementov, ki se jih težje meri in kvantificira. Takšen pristop zahteva podrobno obravnavo narave in razvoja pravnih norm ter s tem odpira pot analizi korporacijskega upravljanja z vidika manj znanih teorij prava in sociologije.
Downloads
References
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Bebchuk, L. A. & Roe, M. J. 1999. A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance. Stanford Law Review, 52: 127-170.
Becker, G. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour: University of Chicago Press. Berglöf, E. & Von Thadden, E. L. 2000. The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Developing and Transition Economies. In S. Cohen & G. Boyd (Eds.), Corporate Governance and Globalisation: 275-306. Chaltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
Berglöf, E. & Pajuste, A. 2003. Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe. In P. K. Cornelius & B. Kogut (Eds.), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy: 267-302: Oxford University Press.
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richards, J.-F. 2002. Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect. European Economic Review, 47: 165-195.
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richards, J.-F. 2003. The Transplant Effect. American Journal of Comparative Law, 51: 163-203.
Berle, A. & Means, G. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.
Cadbury Report (Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance), available at http://www.ecgi.org.
Calabresi, G. 1961. Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts. Yale Law Journal, 70(4): 499-553.
Cheffins, B. R. 2001. Law, Economics and the UK's System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from History. Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 1: 71-89.
Coase, R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Costs. Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.
Coffee, J. C. 1999. The Future as History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93: 641-707.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to move forward, COM (2003) 284 final, Brussels, 21 May 2003, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0284:EN:NOT.
Gilson, R. 2001. Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function American Journal of Comparative Law, 49: 329-357.
Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations and comparative advantage: Oxford University Press.
Hansmann, H. & Kraakman, R. 2001. The End of History for Corporate Law. Georgetown Law Journal: 439-468.
Hutchinson, T. W. 1984. Institutionalist Economics: Old and New. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140: 20-29.
Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. 1998. A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics. Stanford Law Review, 50: 1471-1550.
Jordan, C. & Lubrano, M. 2002. How Effective are Capital Markets in Exerting Governance on Corporations: Lessons of Recent Experience with Private and Public Legal Rules in Emerging Markets, Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance, 52: 1131.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113-1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, 54: 471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 3.
Matthews, R. C. O. 1986. The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth. Economic Journal, 96: 903-918.
North, D. C. 1984. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140: 7-17.
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Cambridge University Press.
Pearson, H. 1997. Origins of Law and Economics: The Economists' New Science of Law, 1830-1930: Cambridge University Press.
Pistor, K., Raiser, M., & Gelfer, S. 2000. Law and Finance in Transition Economies: EBRD Working Paper N. 48.
Pistor, K. 2004. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies. European Business Organization Law Review 1(1): 59-110.
Posner, R. A. 1977. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Posner, R. A. & Parisi, F. 1997. Introduction. In R. A. Posner & F. Parisi (Eds.), Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Posner, R. A. & Parisi, F. 2002. The Economic Foundations of Private Law: An Introduction In R. A. Posner & F. Parisi (Eds.), The Economic Foundations of Private Law Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Priest, G. R. 1977. The Common Law Process and the Selection for Efficient Rules. Journal of Legal Studies 6: 65-82.
Roe, M. 1994. Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance: Princeton University Press.
Roe, M. 1996. Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics. Harvard Law Review, 109: 641-668.
Roe, M. 2000. Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control. Stanford Law Review, 53: 539-606.
Roe, M. J. 2002. Corporate Law's limits. Journal of Legal Studies, 31: 233-267.
Roe, M. J. 2003. Political Determinants of Corporate Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rubin, P. R. 1977. Why is the Common Law Efficient? Journal of Legal Studies 6: 51-63.
Singh, A. 2003. Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance and Stock Markets in Emerging Countries. Journal of Corporate Law Studies 3(1): 41-72.
