Freedom and the Hierarchy of Will

Authors

  • Danilo Šuster Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

Frankfurt, person, freedom of will and free will, hierarchy of will, regress problem, manipulation problem

Abstract

According to compatibilists freedom of action is typically the freedom to do what one wants to do. But does not real freedom of will consists of being free to have the will one wants to have? Harry Frankfurt in his seminal 1971 article develops a hierarchical theory of will, sometimes called hierarchical mesh theory. Free action is motivated by the desire one wants to have and a person enjoys freedom of the will when he is free to will what he wants to will. A distinction, often overlooked and not clearly expressed by Frankfurt himself, between acting of one’s own free will and acting with a will that is free is explained. The second notion requires alternative possibilities, but the first, which is sufficient for moral responsibility, does not. Frankfurt’s theory faces two main problems. The problem of regress arises when we ask ourselves about the reasons for accepting second-order volitions. Based on an analogy with the skeptical regress of justification I claim that Frankfurt in his later work presents a successful “foundationalist” response to the problem. The problem of manipulation concerns the history of higher-order volitions, they could well be manipulated or programmed. But according to Frankfurt a freely willed action for which an agent is morally responsible is purely a function of the relation between an agent’s will and her second-order volitions, so it does not matter in any way how an agent came to have that particular mesh.

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Published

31.12.2004

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Šuster, D. (2004). Freedom and the Hierarchy of Will. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 8(4), 46–58. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6925