A Review of Burge’s Solution of Mental Causation
Keywords:
mental causation, exclusion problem, epiphenomenalism, token physicalism, supervenience, explanatory practiceAbstract
Some anti-reductionists try to find a plausible answer to the question how can mental properties be causally efficacious under a supposition of supervenience as a metaphysical relation between the mental and the physical which makes underlaying physical properties be the only causes of physical events kicking thereby mental properties out of explanatory theories about our physical behaviour in a peculiar manner. They appeal to the idea that this problem, called the problem of causal exclusion, follows from our false assumption that upperlaying mental properties must be in some way dependent on physical properties since it is only under this condition that they have, at least in some sense, a causal status. They try to save mental causation solely by appealing to explanatory practice in which mental properties are everyday described as causes of our physical behaviour. Therefore, explanatory practice is supposed to be a true fundament upon which mental properties have causal roles no matter what the metaphysical relation between mind and body is. This article introduces a critique of Burge’s solution of the exclusion problem, which belongs to this class of proposals, suggesting that we do not avoid the mentioned problem by appealing to explanatory practice.
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