Error Theory: Moral Cognitivism with Moral Irrealism
Keywords:
error theory, moral realism, cognitivism, moral objectivity, queerness argument, J.L. Mackie, nondescriptive cognitivism, fictionalismAbstract
Error theory for morality maintains that every simple positive moral statement is false or erroneous. J. L. Mackie defended such an error theory by claiming that ordinary moral statements contain an objectivity claim, which in order to be fulfilled stipulates an existence of mind/language independent moral reality that cannot be accommodated inside a naturalistic picture of the world. The idea of such a reality is incoherent; therefore moral statements are systematically false. Any kind of error theory represents a serious step away from ordinary common-sense and must thus offer an explanation of sources of error and reasons for its persistence and deep-rottenness. In response to this challenge Mackie offered several different patterns of objectifications. The article deals with three possible responses to Mackie¢s error theory. The first is moral realism whose task is to find a way to refute arguments for incoherence of the idea of objective moral reality. The second kind of response consists of modern versions of moral non-cognitivism offering an answer to the question of why moral judgments seem or are nonetheless authorative. The third kind of response is represented by recently developed metaethical positions of non-descriptive cognitivism and moral fictionalism.
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