Kripke and Dummett on the Possibility of the Existence of Unicorns
Keywords:
Kripke, Dummett, unicorns, natural kinds, rigid designators, causal theory of reference, modalityAbstract
Concerning the possible existence of unicorns Kripke defends two theses: a metaphysical thesis that no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns; and an epistemological thesis that an archeological discovery of animals with all the features attributed to unicorns in the appropriate myth would not in itself constitute proof that there were unicorns. In defending these theses, he relies on his semantic theory of natural kind terms and his causal theory of reference. Dummett rejects both, although slightly differently formulated, and argues that they are conflicting with our linguistic practice. Additionally, the metaphysical thesis cannot even be consistently defended within Kripke’s theory, while the acceptance of the possibility that unicorns exist reveals S4 and not the intuitively more acceptable S5 as the right modal system for metaphysical modality. I will try to determine who of the two is right – Kripke or Dummett?
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