Machines And Consciousness: The Problem Of Qualia
Keywords:
phenomenal consciousness, qualia, ‘what it’s like’, the knowledge argument, the inverted spectrumAbstract
The article deals with the question whether the phenomenal consciousness, i.e. ‘what it’s like’, is something reserved for humans, or something that even a machine could have, at least in one of possible worlds. It introduces the problem of qualia as being derived from the three of consciousness’ many problems that are usually associated with the so called hard problem of consciousness, i.e. the question, how qualia can be physical. The knowledge argument proving that qualia are non-physical is threatening to defeat physicalism, and philosophers disagree about the right way of how to reject it. By the help of the simple dilemma, the article suggests that for establishing whether or not there can also be conscious machines we do not have to agree about how to reject the knowledge argument from the physicalistic point of view for the nature of qualia does not play any role at ascribing phenomenal consciousness to, e.g. robots.
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Copyright (c) 2014 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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