Capital Punishment And The Right To Life
Keywords:
capital punishment, right to life, right to self-defense, right to threaten, right to punish, conflicts of rights, moral desertAbstract
The paper deals with one particularly popular and widespread argument against capital punishment, the appeal to a universal and inalienable right to life. While most legal documents explicitly assert the latter as one of, if not the, fundamental human right(s), only a handful go a step further and try to draw direct implications for the practice of death penalty from it. Of many international organizations, Amnesty International is by far the most unequivocal, in that it grounds its powerful demand for the worldwide abolition of capital punishment in the right of every human being, including murderers’, to life. My aim is to (re)cast some doubt on this strategy, by, first, drawing attention to the indeterminatness of this right’s nature, content, scope and weight, and, second, by introducing other morally relevant considerations (competing/conflicting rights, duties, desert, and so on) which effectively block, or seriously complicate, any attempt to directly infer the prohibition on all deliberate killing, including death penalty, from an ascription of such a right. I conclude with a couple of critical observations on the predominant practice/habit of conducting our moral inquires in terms of equally basic and irreducible, but also potentialy conflicting, (prima facie) moral rights.
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Copyright (c) 2014 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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