Dummett on Pejoratives – a Defense and a Proposal
Keywords:
pejoratives, theory of truth, M. Dummett, T. WilliamsonAbstract
In the first part of the next section I summarize Dummett’s pioneering proposal for understanding pejoratives, and then I pass to Williamson’s criticisms. I suggest that we accept Williamson’s rejection of inferentialism, but defend Dummett on his view that pejoratives are to be understood in terms of their negative contribution to the truth value of typical sentences in which they occur. In the second part, relying on the two authors discussed, I build a dilemma, which I argue is central for contemporary understanding of pejoratives. Finally, in Section Three I propose my own solution to the Dilemma, o truth-conditional pluralist alternative, which I dub »negative hybrid social kind terms theory«.
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