Introduction: The Meaning of Mathematical Objects in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Keywords:
philosophy of mathematics, realism, anti-realism, platonism, structuralismAbstract
Mathematical objects in classical mathematics are interpreted as numbers, sets, functions, relations, matrix etc. The definitions of these notions in mathematics are not troublesome. On the contrary, in philosophy – as a consequence of difficulty to define a mathematical object – there were developed numerous theories. In this paper we tackle the platonism, realism, and anti-realism in mathematics. In mathematical platonism we consider Linnebo’s understanding of mathematical objects as abstract entitities, independent of us, our thoughts, language, and practice. Causal inaccessibility of mathematical objects led us to the question how useful is mathematics in the domain of concrete things if it is supposed to describe mathematical objects as abstract. We consider the usefullness of mathematics in Field’s theory, who is a fictionalist and claims that mathematics is a useful fiction. We realized that anti-realist Field appeals to the mathematical objects that do not exist and are only fiction while platonist Linnebo appeals to the mathematical objects which do exist but are causal inaccessible to us. From this evidence we concluded that these two philosophical theories are sharply adversative. In the paper we also pointed to the different meaning of mathematical objects at mathematical platonist and realist and confronted with the representative of realistic version of structuralism, namely Shapiro. We realized that Shapiro, like Linnebo, advocates the existence of mathematical objects, but claims that only structural features define these objects.
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