The Problem of Metaphysical Freedom
Keywords:
personal freedom, negative freedom, positive freedom, metaphysical freedom; sourcehood, control, choice, (in)determinism, the dilemma of freedom and determinismAbstract
Problem of free will is perhaps most voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. In this survey article various concepts of freedom are analysed: (i) personal freedom: “S does A freely iff A is up to S”; (ii) negative freedom – “S does A freely iff nothing prevents S from doing A”; (iii) positive freedom – “S does A freely iff S does what she wants”; (iv) metaphysical freedom – S does A freely in the sense important for moral responsibility only if (a) S is the source of A, (b) S has control over A, (c) S has a choice about A – S could have done otherwise. Sourcehood, control and choice are threatened by determinism, itself a doctrine with various meanings: (i) a thesis about universal causality; (ii) a thesis about (causal) sufficiency; (iii) a thesis about the existence of a deterministic theory; (iv) a thesis that world W, is deterministic just in čase for any physically possible world W2, if W2 agrees with W, at any time as far as relevant physical properties are concerned, then W, agrees with W, at all times (Earman). The problem of metaphysical freedom and determinism is expressed by the following dilemma: (i) Determinism is either true or false; (ii) If determinism is true, then no one has free will; (iii) If determinism is not true, then no one has free will; (iv)Thus, no one has free will.
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