Wittgenstein and Ryle on Philosophy of Psychology

Authors

  • Tomaž Grušovnik Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

Keywords:

philosophy of mind, conceptual analysis, private language, rule-following, knowledge how, knowledge that, Wittgenstein, Ryle

Abstract

The article concerns Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s philosophy of psychology. It is shown that their views on mind are akin so that it is reasonable to put them together. Both contain following main topics: (1) heterogeneity of mental concepts, (2) criticism of Cartesian privacy, and (3) criticism of representations. With investigations into use of words, which are concerned with mind, both Wittgenstein and Ryle try to determine their characteristics more precisely and eliminate misunderstandings that have gathered around them through history (of philosophy) and that lead into (quasi)philosophical problems. They find that words, with which we refer to the mind, do not refer to any thing in the same way that words for material things refer to bodies.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

30.09.2005

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Grušovnik, T. (2005). Wittgenstein and Ryle on Philosophy of Psychology. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 9(3), 94–120. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6949