Can It Ever Be Rational to Choose Death over Life?

Authors

  • Friderik Klampfer Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

life, death, value, interest, personal good, rationality of choice and conduct

Abstract

Disputes over proposals to legalize (active voluntary) euthanasia tend to run into a familiar deadlock: can the deliberate ending of human life ever be morally justified, or is it prohibited even when carried out with the most benevolent motive, or the best intentions, and following the patient’s explicit request? Advocates of the (legal) recognition of the (moral) right to determine the time and manner of one’s own death usually appeal to the moral principle commanding respect for the rational and autonomous will of every human person. Opponents typically maintain that the decision to die prematurely is rarely, if ever, autonomous and rational, and as such not really authoritative/obligatory.

Disagreements concerning the alleged benefits of premature death are as old as philosophy itself. In this article I therefore address an ancient philosophical riddle when I ask: “Is it ever (prudentially) rational to wish for one’s own premature death, to pursue it as a goal, to form an intention to bring it about, and/or to perform actions in the hope of facilitating or hastening it?” And in giving an affirmative reply to it, I walk in the steps of such philosophical giants as Socrates, Epicurus and Hume. My defense of the rationality of suicide is indirect and proceeds through a critique of three modem authors: P. Devine, K. Wilkes, and D. Oderberg. All of them, though each for his or her own specific reasons, emphatically (or at least tacitly) deny the possibility of a rational preference for premature death over continued life. We can never form a rationally justified evaluative judgment about the comparative advantage of immediate death over continued life, they contend, but even if we could, such a judgment would be necessarily false. Building on ideas of F. Feldman and D. Velleman, I show that life-and-death choices do not presuppose attaching exact value to death which in turn would presuppose some unattainable knowledge of its nature. What we need to compare instead, is merely the respective values of two possible lives, the longer one and the shorter one. The latter will, upon reflection, sometimes turn out to contain less of those things that are, or make our life, bad for us, and when this is so, the only prudent thing to do will be to put an end to our existence.

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Published

31.05.2004

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Klampfer, F. (2004). Can It Ever Be Rational to Choose Death over Life? Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 8(1-2), 3–35. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6894