Contextualism, Counterfactuals and Realism
Keywords:
contextualism, counterfactuals, strict conditionals, (anti)realism, inferences in conditional logicAbstract
The contextualist claim about a given sentence is that it expresses different propositions with different truth values as uttered in some different contexts. Contextualism is philosophically attractive, it promises a simple resolution of big philosophical problems (each sentence expresses a true proposition as uttered in the context in which we accept it, but in no single context do they all express true propositions). But the problem, recognized already by Plato, is that contextualism seems to lead directly to relativism and subjectivism. Originally contextualism is a thesis about language – how to evaluate the truth value of utterances. In this article a theory of counterfactual conditionals as contextually strict conditionals is defended. Some problematic conditional patterns of inference are analysed (hypothetical syllogism, contraposition, strengthening of the antecedent). They seem invalid and really are invalid on the standard Stalnaker-Lewis semantical model of counterfactuals. But they turn out to be valid for contextually strict conditionals. It is argued that contextualism about counterfactuals has no dire consequences with respect to the problem of realism. Some counterfactual disputes are “real” disputes about matters of fact, about objective connections and (in)dependencies “in the world.”
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