Extrinsic Mental Properties as a Problem of Mental Causation

Authors

  • Janez Bregant Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

computationalism, externalism, internalism, mental causation, extrinsicness of the mental, mental property epiphenomenalism

Abstract

Computationalism is a source of problems for psychology and its explanations of behaviour as well as for philosophical discussions about mental causation since it supposes that contents of our beliefs, desires and other intentional states, because it is their structure or shape that has causal powers, are not causally relevant. Intentional states are at risk that their content, which is their main characteristic and because of which they play causal roles at explaining our behaviour, will lose a causal relevance of any sort, which is called the problem of extrinsicness of the mental. The article also introduces Dretske’s solution of this problem based on a distinction between two kinds of causes, triggering and structuring, and my objection to it saying that such a move leads to mental property epiphenomenalism and therefore does not represent a true alternative.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

30.09.2003

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Bregant, J. (2003). Extrinsic Mental Properties as a Problem of Mental Causation. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 7(3), 3–15. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6784