Is Identity Really Necessary?
Keywords:
identity, necessity, substitution, property, predicateAbstract
The article handles the problem of necessary identities, i.e., the question, are all identities really necessary. I try to find a logical factor, which would block the well-known derivation of this statement (Marcus, Quine, Kripke etc.), and offer the difference between the real and the nominal identity. The first identity is the identity of things, and the second is the identity of meaning. The first concerns properties of things and the second concerns all predicates of a given language, which directly or indirectly refer on a thing. Real identity allows only the substitution of names in the property-predicates, and the nominal identity allows the substitution of names in all predicates of a given language. Real identity generally speaking isn’t necessary, because the predicate “necessary (x = a)” which is occurring in the proof of the claim that all identities are necessary, doesn’t express a property of things. It signifies the kind of belonging of the property (x = a) to all values of x. Thus we cannot use the predicate “necessary (x = a)” in the proof. The question: is an identity contingent or necessary, is the question of ontology or semantics, and not a question of formal logical. The question: is an identity real or nominal, is empirical and not logical.
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Copyright (c) 2002 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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