Kripke’s Argumentation for Essentialism
Keywords:
essentialism, de re and de dicto necessity, scientific essentialism, KripkeAbstract
The article presents Kripke's contribution to ontology (metaphysics) as can be grasped from his seminal book Naming and Necessity. It is intended for the reader who fosters the tradition of historical concern with philosophy. The main topic is Kripke’s argumentation for essentialism. The essential modalities are, according to his view, more broad-minded than naturalistic ones. On the other hand essential modalities prohibit something which is allowed by pure logic: it is not logical impossible for a cat to be a bear but that is not possible as to its essence. Thus, says Kripke, possibility and necessity which are linked to essences (essential modalities) are different and stricter than logical possibilities and necessities. These are according to Kripke metaphysical modalities. In the last part of the article we evaluate essentialistic intuitions. It seems that they are fallible but rather reliable guides for scientists and that is the good reason why we should not doubt in them too much.
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