Fate
Keywords:
determinism, fatalism, sea-battle argument, idle argumentAbstract
In this article author discusses the view that whatever happens is fated to happen. Although there are different sources of such a view, author examines two philosophical arguments for this thesis. The first one is the Sea-battle argument (Aristotle, Taylor). There are at least three problems with this argument: (1) it is questionable whether statements about future contingencies have truth value, (2) substantial conclusions are derived from purely formal premises, and (3) arguments seems to be based upon a modal fallacy. The second examined argument is the Idle argument. It is argued that it is unsound because no conclusion about our abilities to influence the course of events can follow from purely formal premises. The obvious and trivial truth that “Che sara sara!” can not answer the question “Che sara?” Further, author draws a distinction between the rough and the sophisticated version of fatalism, and tries to show that the rough version seems simply false, while the sophisticated version seems to be depraved of any empirical content. Nevertheless, author thinks that predictability can give empirical content to the thesis of fatalism. At the end of the article, author tries to examine the relationship between the thesis of fatalism and attitudes we should have toward our own life.
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Copyright (c) 2002 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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