Lewis on Counterfactuals

Authors

  • Danilo Šuster Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

David Lewis, theory of counterfactuals, conditional logic, possible worlds semantics, similarity

Abstract

Counterfactuals, conditionals of the form “if it had been the case, that A, then it would have been the case, that B”, play an important role in the analyses of philosophically important concepts. David Lewis (and independently R. Stalnaker) developed an elegant semantical explanation in terms of possible worlds. According to Lewis counterfactuals are variably strict conditionals. This approach successfully explains semantical intuitions about inferential patterns valid in the classical logic of material and strict conditionals but invalid in the logic of counterfactuals. However, Lewis’s account uses the notion of global similarity which was initially unanalysed. Counterexamples show that intuitive global similarity is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the truth of counterfactuals. This critique might succeed as a refutation of the analysis of counterfactuals, but it does not undermine the value of semantical explanation in terms of possible worlds.

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Published

30.06.2002

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Šuster, D. (2002). Lewis on Counterfactuals. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 6(1-2), 95–108. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6757