Quine’s Nondogmatic and Pragmatistic Empiricism
Keywords:
convention, analytic/synthetic, experience, holism, pragmatismAbstract
“Is Quine’s philosophy pragmatistic?” is the main question of the text. The central background of the answer builts foremost a presentation of the Quine’s view on convention and his repudiation of two dogmas of empiricism: distinguishing, on the virtue of isolated consideration of particular statements, between analitical and sinthetical statements and of possibility of reduction of all meaningfull statements to the statements about immediate experience. Around this core the author organised his other observations about Quine's philosophy. The second part of the text trys to find out what pragmatism actually is. In conclusion it is claimed that it makes sense to characterize Quine’s philosophy as a sui generis instance of a scientistic and naturalistic pragmat(ist)ic thought. Because of its central orientation on science and because of the role and meaning that it has atributed to science, this philosophy crystallised out foremost as a special form of instrumentalism. In the stream of the text some more important objections against Quine’s philosophy, closely connected with the topic of the present article, are considered.
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Copyright (c) 2001 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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