The Theory/Observation Distinction in the Philosophy of Science

Authors

  • Miklavž Vospernik Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

philosophy of science, theory/observation distinction

Abstract

Reviewing general problems that concern the theory/observation distinction in the philosophy of science I argue that this distinction still plays an essential role. What is more, even so radical philosophical views as realism and so-called historicism can explain away the distinction only, because they are partial – historicism is (extremely) non-realist, realism, of course, (extremely) realist. Any of the later two, however, calls for a further argument, which is not an easy task to accomplish.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

31.03.2002

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Vospernik, M. (2002). The Theory/Observation Distinction in the Philosophy of Science. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 5(3), 33–54. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6731