Metaphor and Depiction

Abstract

I present a pictorial theory of metaphor that is built on the improved Wittgenstein’s pictorial theory of statement. I add to the Wittgenstein’s theory the concept of indicators of relations. The expression that describe a relation between some objects is not a name of this relation but is the indicator of the relation between names in the sentential sign. The indicator of the name-relation helps to determine more precisely the relation between the objects which should be depicted by the statement. However, the indicator has no independent meaning. In the case of metaphoric statements we get the indirect depiction of complexes. This happens by the referring to a complex that is in some degree formally similar to the actually depicted complex. I take notice of some difficulties of this improved theory of logical picture. It follows from this theory that in ordinary language they are any pure non-metaphoric statements. They are possible some different steps on metaphorsic meaning. Many “mataphysical” statements have no pictorial meaning. They are also any metaphors but some pseudo-statements that play the role of virtual metaphors.