Concepts as Representations, as Senses, and as Abilities

Abstract

There are three main approaches to the ontology of concepts: representationalism, Fregeanism, and the mixed view combining representationalism and Fregeanism. The representationalist view views concepts as mental representations, while Fregeanism states that concepts are Fregean senses. Each of these accounts has several advantages. Nevertheless, along with their advantages, these views also have significant disadvantages, which will be highlighted in this article. In this context, I propose an alternative view, which I call »abilitism«. Abilitism is an approach to the ontology of concepts that holds that concepts are capabilities for coordinating groups of capabilities. This approach solves all the problems of representationalism, Fregeanism, and the mixed view. Abilitism is also well suited to explain concept pluralism and partial ownership of concepts. However, there are some possible objections to abilitism, which I will answer in the final sections.