Realism for Beginners: Pride and Modesty
Keywords:
Devitt, (anti)realism, epistemology, skepticism, truth, (in)dependenceAbstract
I critically discuss Michael Devitt's metaphysical descriptions of common-sense realism: "Most of the observable physical entities of common sense and science exist mind-independently," and scientific realism: "Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mind-independently." Traditionally the issue of realism includes three components: semantic, epistemological and metaphysical. What is the relation between them? The main problem for realists is to explain how knowledge about the (external) world is possible without compromising its independence. Devitt does not offer a satisfactory response to this epistemological challenge. I understand realism as a regulative ideal of our best methodology for inquiry about the world.
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