Measurement and Observable/Unobservable Distinction in Science

Authors

  • Miklavž Vospernik Faculty of Education, University of Maribor

Keywords:

the theory/observation distinction, measurement, positivism, reduction to observables

Abstract

The positivist theory/observation distinction in science is at least indirectly one of the by-products of the general positivistic verificationist epistemic programme. In particular, within science the positivists understood the general demand for verification as a reduction to what is according to common-sense taken to be directly perceivable through our senses. Common-sense directly perceivable entities (such as the so-called “middle-sized” objects) were supposed to be something that one could easily know of and existing independently of us. Judgment about entities such as electrons, electric fields etc. should on the contrary get its meaning only after a successful reduction (to observables). If all this were true, then we could ask what would happen if we applied the general positivist-verificationist programme to the analysis of measurement? Would this also lead to the commonsensebased positivist distinction between the observable and the unobservable (i.e. theoretical)? In what follows we shall argue that this is not the case. We shall do this by analysing the most developed measurement theory that could be taken to share positivistic roots at least in as far as the general verificationist programme is concerned: the measurement theory of Brian Ellis (1966).

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Published

31.12.2005

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Vospernik, M. (2005). Measurement and Observable/Unobservable Distinction in Science. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 9(4), 3–22. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6950