Generalism and Particularism in Aesthetics: Sibley and Dancy
Keywords:
aesthetics, ethics, generalism, particularism, thick and thin conceptAbstract
The first part of article deals with presentation and analysis of Sibley’s generalism and then critically compares it with its Beardsley’s s variant. It seems that Sibley rigourously distinguishes between general criteria served in articulating and justifying our overall evaluation of the work of art, and possible general criteria applicated in deciding what the nature of the interaction is among the work’s variegated properties. In the last case we, for example, realize that the work’s dominant property (for instance, dramatic intensivity) is weakened rather then intensified by other (for example, humour). This is understandable because as a sort of generalist he is not in need to make the proposal that the results of complicated interactions between work’s properties are also governed by some set of rules. The particularist will here contravene that genuine generalist should also admit the view that judgements about the nature of interactions between aesthetic properties are governed by general criteria. He also should not be satisfied with Sibley’s view that some aesthetic properties have inherent value in vacuo because particularist’s claim is that all aesthetic value emerge from the unique set of interrelations existing in terms of the context of a particular work. Individual properties do not enter in these interrelations with any preassigned or inherent value; a value only emerges as a result of these complex work’s interelations.
In the second and the last part of article I unfold objections to some consequences of Dancy’s particularism. On Dancy’s view on thick concepts, a thick concept is, somehow, associated with both a property and an attitude, but these are not in any way separable elements of the concepts, since the property is best described as that of meriting the attitude, and the attitude is best characterized as the appropriate one given the presence of the property. With the help of Levinson’s view I argue for the principled distinguishability between descriptive in attitudinal component in all aesthetic evaluative terms. Dancy claims, that what is of value about friendship would have no value if that friendship was o sham, but that it is not o sham is not part of what makes the friendship worthwhile. Genuiness is on enabling condition here, not a ground. If that is the case, so I argue, then the pity felt toward Anna Korenina would change its primitive or, if you want, “default” positive value in a negative one. What is of value about pity would have no value if that pity was a pretence. This state of affairs seems to me strongly counterintuitive. Pity has not changed its polarity here because this is not a case of genuine pity.
At the end I show that there is no essential difference between Dancy’s view on default value and reversible generalism in aesthetics. The reversibilist criterion of valence does not requires an explanation only when a positively valenced property is held to be of positively value in an artwork, whereas non-valenced properties, whether they turn to be of positive or negative value, need to be explained in both cases. An explanation is needed when a valenced property is exemplified in on artwork only when the value of that property differs from its valence. If it so, then it seems that the pressumed asymmetry between valenced and no-valenced properties can no longer be held. The reversible generalist explains a positively valenced property’s negative or nonexistent contribution to the positive value of an artwork in terms of how the property interacts with other properties. But the same kind of explanation is tacitly assumed when a positively valenced property makes o positive contribution to the value of an artwork. In that case, that is, in a case when a positively valenced property makes a positive contribution to the value of an artwork, we must rely on the further premise that this property interacts with the other properties in such a way as to allow it to make its positive contribution. That premise is necessary for everyone who holds that the positively valenced property does not always make a positive contribution to an artwork. From this it follows that asymmetry postulate fails.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2005 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.