On the Requirement for Proper Beginning
Keywords:
argument, begging the question, circularity, dependency, epistemic model, pragma-dialectics, Frank JacksonAbstract
Robinson’s (1971 and 1981) challenge with respect to the traditional fallacy of begging the question can be expressed as a dilemma – every argument is question-begging (for the respondent who disagrees with the conclusion) or not a single one is (it is just that the conclusion does not follow or one of the premises is unacceptable). Some have (unsuccessfully) tried to meet the challenge with a purely formal characterization but since Aristotle there are two main schools in explanation of the fallacy: dialectical mistake (an improper move in reasoned dialogue) and epistemic approaches which concentrate on the probative function of arguments and analyze them in terms of reasonable belief, confidence, probability, etc. Begging the question is committed, typically, when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. I compare the pragma-dialectical approach with the complex, epistemically-pragmatic theory of Frank Jackson, who successfully meets the old Millian challenge of circularity committed by every valid argument. The central, probative function of an argument involves the use of the premises in the argument as a basis to justify the conclusion so that the respondent, who initially doubted the conclusion, will now come to accept it because of these premises. In this sense the conclusion is epistemically dependent on the premises. If the direction of the dependence is reversed, begging the question occurs. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance) as its basis, but then petitio is committed whenever one argues using premises which are not accepted in the conversation. This is implausible. Also, the basis for introducing commitments is not discussed – very likely the reasons will be epistemic. The epistemic approach should therefore be preferred.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2010 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.