Hume about Personal Identity
Keywords:
David Hume, personal identity, bundle theory of mind, SelfAbstract
In this article author briefly presents Hume’s theory of personal identity by stressing its sceptical-constructive moment: the denial of the existence of the self as a fact, of which we are “intimately conscious” and outlining the mechanism which on the basis of relations of resemblance and causation between different perceptions produces the fiction of the identical self. This is followed by a presentation of the most important objections to Hume which are separated into two parts: firstly, the so called “objections to principles”, which question Hume’s presuppositions. The author tries to show that although these might be correct, they can be confronted in a similar way in which they try to confront Hume. Second are so called “objections to system” which deal with the (in)consistency of the theory. The author remarks that second objections are strong and that Hume’s theory as it is can hardly sustain them, what was probably known to Hume himself. In spite of certain difficulties and diverse interpretations, Hume’s contribution to the problem of personal identity remains invaluable.
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