Feyerabend and Critical Rationalism
Keywords:
science, pseudoscience, Popper, Feyerabend, LakatosAbstract
This article represents commentary of Feyerabend’s Theses on Anarchism. We begin with a description of cir- cumstances of formation these Theses and then we pass to the basic question, which they pose, that is the problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. This problem is not an easy one, as we may expect, and this is because of the success of skepticism. In this frame we follow Lakatos’s variant of the history of ideas, whose leading motive is thought, that the idea of demarcation on rational ground had to retreat in more and more loose programs under the attack of skepticism and relativism: from inductivism to Popperian falsificationism and finally to Lakatos‘s own methodology of scientific research programmes. In this respect we deal with Popper’s logic of scientific discovery, Lakatos‘s critique of it and then his improved version, which is still founded on the idea that the decisions of scientists are rational. Feyerabend on the contrary means that both, Popper and Lakatos have failed. He reproaches Popper that his methodology is unpluralistic and unrealistic also. Con- ceptual change does not arise from argument in the sense of Popper’s approximation to the truth, but with propaganda and other factors, which are not strictly rational. Criticism of Lakatos is the same: decisions of scientists when they are confronted with alternatives are a matter of habits, taste, social and political circumstances, culture etc. At the end of the article we present Lakatos‘s criticism of the Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism.
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Copyright (c) 2001 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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