The Three Ways of G. E. Moore
Keywords:
G. E. Moore, proof of an external world, skepticism, argument, begging the questionAbstract
A Moorean defense of common-sense knowledge and his strategy of refuting skepticism as presented in his »Proof of an External world«, »Certainty« and »Four forms of skepticism« is analyzed. Two difficulties are exposed: Moore does not explain the intuitive strength of skeptical arguments and does not base his refutations on a developed theory of knowledge. And secondly, Moore’s proof is often presented as a classical example of begging the question. Three articles end with three different responses to the skeptic: (i) we do possess evidence to refute the skeptical hypothesis – »Certainty«; (ii) the premises of the skeptical argument are much less convincing then its conclusion – »Four forms of skepticism«; (iii) the premises of Moore’s argument are something he can know without being able to prove – »Proof of an External world.« Each of the strategies has been defended in contemporary Neo-moorean epistemology (i – Sosa; ii – Lycan; iii – Pryor). Since Moore’s proof is connected with the problem of begging the question, the concept of argument and the problem of transmission of warrant (Wright) is also analyzed. The structure of dialectical situation is such that the skeptic can not be refuted in the »game of argumentation.« But there is an old ambiguity in the fallacy of »begging the question« – the fallacy can be understood in the context of a dialogue, when one wins by relying on the opponent’s granting the point at issue. And there is the epistemological fallacy of an »attempt to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself« (Aristotle). Rhetorical deficiency of Moore’s proof does imply its epistemological deficiency.
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