Ad hominem arguments: towards their historical origin

Abstract

Ad hominem arguments usually divide into two types: abusive and circumstantial (tu quoque) types. There is a long debate on historical origin and roots of the argument, however, it is unclear in what sense Aristotle's elaboration of ad hominem fits the modern usage of it. For example, did Aristotle discover the circumstantial ad hominem argument? While Chichi (2002) believes there is at least some evidence for such a claim, Walton (2004) thinks the opposite. In »On Sophistical Refutations« Aristotle proposes that we should examine the discrepancies of the answerer's position either in regard to his own statements, or in regard to those derived from person's character. In other words, he distinguishes between solutions that are directed against the person (pros ton anthropon) and those that are directed against the argument – probably he is thinking of violation of person's own principles or concessions. The paper discusses some textual evidence from »Topics«, »Metaphysics« and »On Sophistical Refutations«, which clearly shows that Aristotle mentions various kinds of the usage of »ad hominem«, all of them being used either in rhetorical or logical manner. I will argue that the rhetorical/logical distinction is the only one Aristotle follows: on the logical side he seems to follow the arguments from commitment, but this excludes circumstantial ad hominem, and on the rhetorical side he questions the ethos of the arguer.