The Answer to Kripke's Challenge: How Can A Posteriori Necessity Seem to Be Contingently True?

Authors

  • Alen Lipuš University of Maribor, Faculty of Arts, Maribor, Slovenia

Keywords:

conceivability argument, mind-body identity, the appearance of contingency, Kripke, intuition of distinctiveness

Abstract

Kripke’s challenge is a demand to explain the appearance of contingency in the case of a posteriori identity of mind and body. The appearance of contingency is present in propositions that are a posteriori identities. Most such propositions are not problematic because the appearance of contingency can be explained in Kripke’s way. Appearance of contingency is present whenever one of the elements in the identity statement refers contingently. In the case of identity of mental and physical, there is no contingent referring and thus it is unexplainable in Kripke's way. However, there is a way to explain the appearance of contingency and it is with the help of the so-called intuition approach, that is the intuition of distinctiveness.

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Naslovnica: Analiza, Letn. 19 Št. 2-3 (2015)

Published

31.12.2015

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Lipuš, A. (2015). The Answer to Kripke’s Challenge: How Can A Posteriori Necessity Seem to Be Contingently True? Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 19(2-3), 109–125. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6431