External Habits Formation and the Environment
Abstract
The present paper presents a standard overlapping generations model with external habits formation and environmental quality in the utility function. Our main objective is to study the impact of external habits on capital accumula- tion and environmental quality on the intertemporal competitive equilibrium. We notice that striving for status leads to environment worsening and capital increasing when the cohort size is large.
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References
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