Functionalism, Computers, and »Chinese Room«
Keywords:
the Chinese Room Argument, artificial intelligence, the symbol system hypothesis, the language of thought hypothesis, computation-representation functionalismAbstract
The article introduces a relation among functionalism which considers mental states as functional states, computers that are according to its computational version able to think and the Chinese Room Argument which is supposed to prove, once and for all, that machines will never be intelligent. The first part shows the fundamental idea and motivation for functionalism together with the main objections to it, the second part of the article represents the Chinese Room Thought Experiment which, formulated as an argument, rejects the idea of thinking machines on the grounds that a manipulation with symbols is not enough for understanding their contents, and the third part summarizes the key objections to the Chinese Room Argument as well as principle answers to them bringing about thereby some new ideas in order to defend the belief that intelligent computers are, in principle, possible.
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