Dummett, Fatalism and conditionals

Authors

  • Danilo Šuster Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor

Keywords:

Dummett, fatalism, lazy argument, conditionals, Stalnaker

Abstract

In “Bringing about the past” (1964) and “Causal Loops” (1986) Dummett defends the possibility of backwards causation. Argument against such a possibility (there is an intrinsic absurdity in doing something in order that something else should happen earlier in time) is convincing but fallacious. The old “lazy” argument (there is an intrinsic absurdity in doing something in order that something else should subsequently happen) has the same form and is also fallacious. Fatalist starts with: “Either E will occur or it will not. If E does not occur, it will not occur even if you do A. If E does occur, it will occur even if you omit to do A.” But for Dummett (1964) on any sense of “if” on which this inference is valid, it is impermissible to pass from “If E does occur, it will occur even if you omit to do A” to “If E does occur, A, if you did it, will have been redundant.” A is redundant, when E occurs, only if E would have occurred even if A had not been performed. The indicative conditional, being of a kind whose truth is guaranteed by the truth of its consequent, will not support the corresponding subjunctive conditional. Dummett (1986) is no longer satisfied with his earlier solution – it is supposed to be messy because it appeals to subjunctive conditionals. Fatalist is wrong in arguing that we can never have a reasonable motive for doing anything. The notion of having a reasonable motive is now explained in terms of indicative conditionals (“We have a ground for asserting that, if we do not do A, E will not occur.”) But Dummett (1986) is either saying that fatalism is not grounded (ancient authors already knew that – the lazy argument was traditionally understood as a reductio of stoic doctrine of fate!) or else introducing, without analysis, indicative conditionals, which are also a »morass.« At the end I sketch and defend a solution, based on a complex apparatus of formal pragmatics, proposed by Stalnaker.

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Published

30.11.2013

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Šuster, D. (2013). Dummett, Fatalism and conditionals. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 17(3), 31–48. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/7022