The Question of the Selfhood and Knowledge in Plato

Authors

  • Boris Vezjak Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor

Keywords:

knowledge, selfhood, forms, Plato, Alcibiades Maior

Abstract

The problem of the self in ancient philosophy usually concems the metaphysical and epistemological issues, where the self is taken to be a sort of real entity. In Plato’s view we are souls, not the bodies or the composites of the two. But in order to know exactly what the self is we have to recognize it. As the knowledge of the self or the self-knowledge is one of the fundamental topics in Plato’s Alcibiades Maior, and some of his other works, the logic of reasoning in this dialogue is the following: Alcibiades should first grasp the idea of selfhood before he can »know himself« and reach self-knowledge. But is it really grasping the form of selfhood that enables us to know ourselves? Descartes’ certitude limited our knowledge only to us – one can know oneself, but is able only to infer to the minds of others. Plato’s famous metaphor from the dialogue is indicative of something rather opposite; the eye can finely see itself only in the reflection of another eye.

The article examines the epistemological and political implications of the notion of the selfhood, a real challenge for Alcibiades, who is eager to become a politician, especially of »taking care of one’s self«, or of ruling others. Namely we have to rule ourselves in order to rule others, as suggests one of the well-known dictums (Ac. I, 127d).

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Published

30.06.2010

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Vezjak, B. (2010). The Question of the Selfhood and Knowledge in Plato. Analiza: časopis Za Kritično Misel, 14(1-2), 5–21. https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/6995