A Presentation and Critique of Kripke’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
Keywords:
Kripke, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, rulle-following, scepticismAbstract
In this paper, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is presented. In his interpretation, Kripke tried to unite – into an apparently convincing whole – all the topics of the Investigations, where the »sceptical problem of rule following«, which leads to the »sceptical paradox«, is taken to be the basis. All other topics are supposed to follow deductively from the problem; the »private language argument« is allegedly already involved in it. In Kripke’s opinion, Wittgenstein invented a new form of scepticism. Kripke holds that Wittgenstein did not deliver a »straight« solution to the sceptical problem but a »sceptical« one. The sceptical solution agrees with the sceptical hypothesis that there is no fact which would justify our notion of rule-following. The essence of Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution is in changing the point of view: rule-following and language are social practices; it does not make any sense to speak of an individual outside a community as if he is following rules and meaning something by his words. Such an interpretation of Wittgenstein is here rejected because the interpretation does not pay enough attention to Wittgenstein’s methodology, nevertheless its importance is not declined.
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