Intuitionism, Moral Conflict and Pluralism of Duties
Keywords:
intuitionism, pluralism, moral conflict, moral dilemmas, prima facie duty, particularism, moral regret, W. D. Ross, H. A. PrichardAbstract
Paper introduces the basic characteristics of intuitionism, its metaethical posits and normative varieties. A special focus pertains to moral pluralism as present in moral theories of H. A. Prichord and W. D. Ross. Pluralism posits a plurality of basic and mutually irreducible moral obligations (principles, duties, prima facie duties, or grounds for obligation) that do not come in a strict order of importance. Pluralism faces the problem of moral conflict and the problem of genuine moral dilemmas, which question its metaethical plausibilily and normative consistency. Intuitionist notion of prima facie duties os originally developed by W. D. Ross is introduced as a possible model of the structure of moral conflicts. The guestion of different interpretations of this notion is put forward. At the end of the paper a reading in terms of moral forces or tendencies is defended, offering also some important insights into the debate between moral generalism and moral particularism.
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