Relativism
Keywords:
relativism, skepticism, realism, dogmatism, knowledge, antirealism, normativity, moralityAbstract
In this article author critically examines the thesis of relativism. He wants to show that the examples which apparently support relativism do not really support relativism as a normative thesis about truth, knowledge and moral norms; these examples rather support weaker thesis of descriptive relativity. Although we may agree that our knowledge is relative to a certain degree, the really interesting question is whether it should be relative. Several different reactions to the factual relativity are compared: realistic, relativistic, skeptic, and dogmatic. Author tries to show that the realistic response is the only adequate response.
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Copyright (c) 2008 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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