Moral Phenomenology and Phenomenological Arguments
Keywords:
moral theory, moral phenomenology, moral experience, phenomenological arguments, cognitivism, realism, intuitionismAbstract
The article deals with moral phenomenology, i.e. with qualitative dimensions of moral experience. These include subjective, qualitative experiences, attitudes and states that accompany moral judgment and action, e.g. experience of what it is like to be caught in a moral dilemma or what it is like to feel demand of a duty. Based on the nature of these experiences, the so-called phenomenological arguments can be put forward by moral theorist. A phenomenological argument is an argument that starts with a phenomenological description of (a) given dimension(s) of moral experience and ends with consequences for metaethics and moral theory. As a case study of such argument I present and discuss Williams’ argument against cognitivism that at least partially rests on moral phenomenology. Then I pose a question regarding the role and strength of such arguments. In the last part I put forward a series of arguments supporting various metaethical and normative facets of moral theory (e.g. realism, cognitivism, pluralism) and I introduce moral intuitionism as a position that receives considerable support form these arguments.
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Copyright (c) 2007 Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti

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